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MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations
1909-1945. By Nigel West. South Yorkshire, UK:
Frontline Books, 2019. ISBN:9781526755742 Charts.
Photos. Notes. Index.. Pp. xxii, 290. $34.95.
First released in the UK in 1983, this handsome reprint is a welcome
addition that once again provides easy access to West’s detailed look at the
origins of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) known as MI6. West
has been a highly respected though sometimes controversial figure in the
Intelligence field for many years. One might even say the controversies
begin with the fact that there is no “Nigel West.” Instead, it is the pen
name of Britain’s former Conservative Party Member of Parliament Rupert
Allason. Nonetheless, under his nom de plume West has authored an
incredible selection of historical books on intelligence agencies and
operations over the last forty years, and those works have marked him as a
tenacious researcher and noted expert in the field.
West’s MI6 is a useful companion to his previously published work on
MI5. Together the books give readers insight not only into the
administrative processes that led to the creation of those agencies, but also
to MI6’s many failures and the inter-agency conflicts, along with the less
frequent triumphs, that marked the early years. Less apparent in the MI6
volume is a full discussion of actual operations. Details are often
necessarily sacrificed in the interest of focusing more how cases affected
the growth and development of the agency. Selected influential cases do
receive more complete examination. This is not a significant flaw; other
authors have detailed a number of those cases in books more specifically
dedicated to operational activities, and West himself has explored several
of them in his own succeeding works.
MI6 is divided into two main parts. The first covers the period 1903-1940,
and the second covers from 1940-1945. Part one includes chapters on the
earliest years of the service, which was thrust into the First World War
within a few years of its creation after focusing almost exclusively on
Russia, not Germany. During that conflict SIS was often sidelined or
overshadowed by the older and more maturely competent Naval
Intelligence Division. Chapters focused on each of the service’s leaders:
Mansfield Cumming, Hugh Sinclair, and Stewart Menzies inform readers
of the service’s growth and struggles as well as the roles those leaders
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played in shaping the focus and direction of the operations that would
eventually prove the worth of SIS and bring it into its own. One early
mistake West suggests, however, might have been the use of Passport
Control Offices (PCO) as the primary cover for SIS operatives. This served
to increase tensions between SIS and the Foreign Office and led to a host
of other issues. Once it became known, for example, that Passport Control
was a cover for intelligence officers—a reality the Germans figured out
pretty quickly—it became an easy matter to identify those intelligence
officers simply by walking into the office and applying for a visa. In fact,
visa applications sometimes took up such a substantial portion of the
PCO’s time that intelligence work had to take a back seat. This became a
particular problem when an increasing number of applications were made
by those seeking to flee the rising threat of Nazi rule in Europe.
In addition to the PCOs, Sinclair had also established a totally separate
network of agents operating under commercial cover known simply as Z.
One of the Z agents, in the midst of Menzies’ later efforts to combine the
two networks, was involved in SIS’ greatest pre-war misstep in the fall of
1939. The so-called Venlo incident involved two senior SIS officers in The
Hague who thought they had arranged with much clandestine effort and
negotiation to meet a highly placed, anti-Nazi Wehrmacht general whom
they intended to spirit to London for secret talks about a possible coup and
the arrest of Hitler. Instead the two agents found themselves suddenly
kidnapped near Venlo on the German-Dutch border in what turned out to
be an elaborate Nazi Security Service scheme that completely
compromised SIS’s already shaky order of battle. An appendix in the book
provides the actual Abwehr synopsis of debriefs of the two kidnapped
agents and shows how fully the organization was compromised. Such
incidents along with the generally poor quality of intelligence provided by
SIS over the years weakened its reputation in Whitehall, so much so that
when the first ULTRA decrypts were later circulated they were largely
ignored because of the distrust resulting from the accumulated
disappointment with SIS’s previous information. Fortunately for MI6, the
decryption work at Bletchley soon proved its value, and West speculates
that had those efforts not been so critical to the war effort it’s possible
“neither Menzies nor his organization could have survived” (263).
Instead, by the end of the Second World War MI6 had ascended to its
zenith. Kim Philby and his associates in the Cambridge Five would bring
the agency down several pegs once more after that.
150
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss3/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.3.1874

Hagerty: MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945. By

Part two is mostly broken into chapters addressing operations in various
locations throughout Europe and the Middle East. It is about a third
longer than part one even though it covers only the five years of war,
during which SIS was largely compelled to obtain much of its information
in exchange for the support it provided to networks run by governments
exiled from the Continent. SIS’s structure was skeletal after Hitler’s troops
had marched over most of Europe, and though its training and support for
the exiled governments’ networks was important, SIGINT eventually
would constitute its saving grace. Unlike World War I, where the Germans
had severely restricted their use of battlefield wireless communications,
the Enigma machines of World War II provided the Nazis with the
confidence to greatly increase radio traffic. It proved at first to be an
embarrassment of riches to SIS. Staff levels, equipment, and processes
were too immature to handle the influx of raw intelligence, and that flaw
took time to address effectively. In addition, MI6’s credibility issues and
its lackluster performance in comparison to MI5’s successes meant the
war’s early years were still a struggle.
If SIS operations seemed apprentice-like at times, failures were often
compounded by the brave yet frequently naïve actions of the stay-behind
intelligence networks on the Continent. Many were filled with volunteers
wholly untrained in intelligence operations, and the networks were
sometimes riddled with informants. One illustrative example is that of the
French INTERALLIE network led by a Polish operative codenamed
VALENTIN, which proved highly successful at first. Eventually the
network was dismantled when a disgruntled cipher clerk and one of
INTERALLIE’s sector leaders betrayed the organization. Within three
days the network’s entire staff had been arrested. The cipher clerk agreed
to inform SIS that VALENTIN had been arrested and that she would be
taking over the network herself. VICTOIRE thus replaced VALENTIN,
and she continued to supply info to SIS using the network’s radio sets now
controlled by the Abwehr. As a result, SIS even connected VICTOIRE with
operatives from Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE). The result
was the immediate interception of two SOE agents landed on the coast.
Once the duplicity was discovered SIS had only to benefit from the hard
lessons learned about lax security procedures and insufficient
compartmentalization, the negative results of which were only
compounded by innocently bringing SOE into the mess.
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The record was not all one of failure however, and among other successes
SIS neutralized NAZI efforts to establish two infra-red detectors placed on
opposite coasts near the Straits of Gibraltar that would have seriously
hindered Allied passage through that area and jeopardized the landings in
North Africa. The detector system on the coast near Tangiers was blown
into the sea by SIS agents, which caused the then useless matching system
in Spain to be abandoned.
One particularly interesting chapter is devoted to the role of the American
Office of Strategic Services (OSS). MI6 had enough problems of its own,
but those were compounded by the sudden insertion of the cousins’
amateurish efforts into the mix. Disagreements over operational methods
or whom to employ as operatives even led to instances of SIS obstructing
OSS operations. An OSS focus on short-term gains unfortunately led the
agency to rely on and support a number of leftist organizations, which
ended up being politically well placed and able to influence Allied policies
in the post-war era.
One complaint about the book is the paucity of notes (fifteen in all) and
the absence of a bibliography. That flaw certainly limits the book’s
usefulness to researchers, but for a general overview of the founding of
MI6 and a glimpse at some select operations, it’s perfectly adequate and
definitely worth reading.
Edward J. Hagerty, American Public University System
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